

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION  
CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Applicant,

v.

BERNARD L. MADOFF INVESTMENT  
SECURITIES LLC,

Defendant.

No. 08-01789 (CGM)

SIPA LIQUIDATION

(Substantively Consolidated)

In re:

BERNARD L. MADOFF,

Debtor.

IRVING H. PICARD, Trustee for the Liquidation of  
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

GROSVENOR INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT  
LTD., GROSVENOR PRIVATE RESERVE  
FUND LIMITED, and GROSVENOR  
BALANCED GROWTH FUND LIMITED,

Defendants.

Adv. Pro. No. 12-01021 (CGM)

**MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS**

**A P P E A R A N C E S :**

*Attorneys for Irving H. Picard, Trustee for the Substantively Consolidated SIPA  
Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC and the Chapter 7 Estate of  
Bernard L. Madoff*

Baker & Hostetler LLP

45 Rockefeller Plaza

New York, NY 10111

By: David Sheehan, Esq.

*Attorneys for Grosvenor Defendants*

PROSKAUER ROSE LLP

Eleven Times Square

New York, NY 10036-8299

By: Ehud Barak, Esq.

Russell T. Gorkin, Esq.

Elliot R. Stevens, Esq.

**CECELIA G. MORRIS**

**UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE**

Pending before the Court is Defendants', Grosvenor Investment Management Ltd. ("Grosvenor Management"), Grosvenor Private Reserve Fund Limited ("Grosvenor Private"), and Grosvenor Balanced Growth Fund Limited ("Grosvenor Balanced") (together, the "Grosvenor Defendants")<sup>1</sup>, motion to dismiss the complaint of Irving Picard, the trustee ("Trustee") for the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC ("BLMIS") seeking to recover subsequent transfers allegedly consisting of BLMIS customer property. Defendants seek dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, for failure to plead a cause of action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8; improper adoption by reference under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c); for failure to state a claim due to the "safe harbor" provision of the Bankruptcy Code; and for failure to allege that they received BLMIS customer property. For the reasons set forth herein, the motion to dismiss is denied in its entirety.

### **Jurisdiction**

This is an adversary proceeding commenced in this Court, in which the main underlying SIPA proceeding, Adv. Pro. No. 08-01789 (CGM) (the "SIPA Proceeding"), is pending. The SIPA Proceeding was originally brought in the United States District Court for the Southern

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<sup>1</sup> After the motion to dismiss was filed, on July 8, 2022, the Trustee dismissed the following claims with prejudice: "that Grosvenor Private received a Fairfield Sentry-Private Subsequent Transfer, as defined in the Complaint, on or about April 14, 2003 in the amount of \$2,500,000; and "that Grosvenor Aggressive received a Fairfield Sentry-Aggressive Subsequent Transfer, as defined in the Complaint, on or about April 14, 2003 in the amount of \$4,191,288." Stip. & Order, ECF No. 118.

District of New York (the “District Court”) as *Securities Exchange Commission v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC et al.*, No. 08-CV-10791, and has been referred to this Court. This Court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) and (e)(1), and 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(2)(A) and (b)(4).

This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (F), (H) and (O). This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over these adversary proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) and 157(a), the District Court’s Standing Order of Reference, dated July 10, 1984, and the Amended Standing Order of Reference, dated January 31, 2012. In addition, the District Court removed the SIPA liquidation to this Court pursuant to SIPA § 78eee(b)(4), (*see* Order, Civ. 08– 01789 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008) (“Main Case”), at ¶ IX (ECF No. 1)), and this Court has jurisdiction under the latter provision. Personal jurisdiction has been contested by these Defendants and will be discussed *infra*.

### **Background**

The Court assumes familiarity with the background of the BLMIS Ponzi scheme and its SIPA proceeding. *See Picard v. Citibank, N.A. (In re BLMIS)*, 12 F.4th 171, 178–83 (2d Cir. 2021), *cert. denied sub nom. Citibank, N.A. v. Picard*, 142 S. Ct. 1209, 212 L. Ed. 2d 217 (2022).

This adversary proceeding was filed on January 12, 2012. (Compl., ECF<sup>2</sup> No. 1). Via the complaint (“Complaint”), the Trustee seeks to recover subsequent transfers made to the Grosvenor Defendants. (*Id.* ¶ 44). Grosvenor Management is the fund manager of Grosvenor Private and Grosvenor Balanced and maintains a place of business in Bermuda. (*Id.* ¶ 22). Grosvenor Private and Grosvenor Balanced are funds registered in Bermuda. (*Id.* ¶¶ 24; 25).

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<sup>2</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, all references to “ECF” are references to this Court’s electronic docket in adversary proceeding 12-01021-cgm.

The subsequent transfers were derived from investments with BLMIS made by Fairfield Sentry Limited<sup>3</sup> (“Fairfield Sentry”). (*Id.* ¶ 44). Fairfield Sentry is considered a “feeder fund” of BLMIS because the intention of the fund was to invest in BLMIS. (*Id.* ¶ 2).

Following BLMIS’s collapse, the Trustee filed an adversary proceeding against Fairfield Sentry and related defendants to avoid and recover fraudulent transfers of customer property in the amount of approximately \$3 billion. (*Id.* ¶ 38). In 2011, the Trustee settled with Fairfield Sentry. (*Id.* ¶ 43). As part of the settlement, Fairfield Sentry consented to a judgment in the amount of \$3.054 billion (Consent J., 09-01239-cgm, ECF No. 109) but repaid only \$70 million to the BLMIS customer property estate. The Trustee then commenced a number of adversary proceedings against subsequent transferees, like Defendants, to recover the approximately \$3 billion in missing customer property.

In their motion to dismiss, the Grosvenor Defendants argue that the safe harbor bars the Trustee’s recovery of this transfer, the Trustee has failed to allege that they hold BLMIS customer property, that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction, that the Trustee has failed to plead a cause of action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, and that the Trustee has improperly used adoption by reference. The Trustee opposes the motion to dismiss.

## **Discussion**

### **Personal Jurisdiction**

Defendants object to the Trustee’s assertion of personal jurisdiction. In the Complaint, the Trustee argues that Defendants purposefully availed itself of the laws of the United States and New York. (Compl. ¶¶ 6–8).

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<sup>3</sup> The Complaint also sought to claw back transfers the Grosvenor Defendants allegedly received from Kingate Global Fund Ltd. (Compl. ¶¶ 51–60, 66–70.) The Trustee subsequently voluntarily dismissed with prejudice those allegations and Count II of the Complaint. Stip. & Order, ECF No. 105.

To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Trustee “must make a prima facie showing that jurisdiction exists.” *SPV Osus Ltd. v. UBS AG*, 882 F.3d 333, 342 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting *Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha*, 609 F.3d 30, 34–35 (2d Cir. 2010)). A trial court has considerable procedural leeway when addressing a pretrial dismissal motion under Rule 12(b)(2). *Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A.*, 722 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2013). “It may determine the motion on the basis of affidavits alone; or it may permit discovery in aid of the motion; or it may conduct an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the motion.” *Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A.*, 722 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting *Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller*, 664 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1981)); see also *Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS)*, 594 B.R. 167, 187 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (same).

“Prior to discovery, a plaintiff challenged by a jurisdiction testing motion may defeat the motion by pleading in good faith, legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction.” *Dorchester Fin.*, 722 F.3d at 84–85 (quoting *Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A.*, 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1990)); *Picard v. Fairfield Greenwich Grp. (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.)*, 627 B.R. 546, 565 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021) (same). In this case, the Trustee has alleged legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction simply by stating that the Grosvenor Defendants “knowingly directing funds to be invested with New York-based BLMIS.” (Compl. ¶ 6). This allegation alone is sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of jurisdiction over Defendants in the pre-discovery stage of litigation. At the pre-discovery stage, the allegations need not be factually supported. See *Dorchester Fin. Securities Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A.*, 722 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2013) (an averment of facts is necessary only after discovery). That being stated, this was not the only allegation made by the Trustee.

In order to be subjected to personal jurisdiction in the United States, due process requires that a defendant have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum in which defendant is sued “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” *Picard v. Bureau of Labor Ins. (In re BLMIS)*, 480 B.R. 501 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012), 480 B.R. 501, 516 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting *Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The pleadings and affidavits are to be construed “in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, resolving all doubts in their favor.” *Chloé v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC*, 616 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting *Porina v. Marward Shipping Co.*, 521 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2008)); *Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS)*, 594 B.R. 167, 187 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018).

The Supreme Court has set out three conditions for the exercise of specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. First, the defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State or have purposefully directed its conduct into the forum State. Second, the plaintiff’s claim must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s forum conduct. Finally, the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable under the circumstances.

*U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Bank of Am. N.A.*, 916 F.3d 143, 150 (2d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).

### **Purposeful Availment**

“[M]inimum contacts . . . exist where the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum and could foresee being haled into court there.” *Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of Am. Corp.*, 883 F.3d 68, 82 (2d Cir. 2018). “Although a defendant’s contacts with the forum state may be intertwined with its transactions or interactions with the plaintiff or other parties, a defendant’s relationship with a third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction.” *U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Bank of Am. N.A.*, 916 F.3d 143, 150 (2d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). “It is insufficient to rely on a defendant’s random, fortuitous, or

attenuated contacts or on the unilateral activity of a plaintiff with the forum to establish specific jurisdiction.” *Id.*

A party “purposefully avail[s] itself of the benefits and protections of New York laws by knowing, intending and contemplating that the substantial majority of funds invested in Fairfield Sentry would be transferred to BLMIS in New York to be invested in the New York securities market.” *Picard v. Bureau of Labor Ins. (In re BLMIS)*, 480 B.R. 501, 517 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).

The Grosvenor Defendants argue that the Trustee has not alleged that they have sufficient contacts with New York. The Complaint suggests otherwise. In the Complaint, the Trustee alleges that the Grosvenor Defendants “knowingly directed funds to be invested with New York-based BLMIS through [Fairfield Sentry].” (Compl. ¶ 6). The Trustee has also alleged that Fairfield Sentry invested almost all of its assets in BLMIS. *See* 09-01239 Compl. ¶ 228 (“Under Fairfield Sentry’s offering memorandum, the fund’s investment manager was required to invest no less than 95% of the fund’s assets through BLMIS.”) (adopted by reference, at paragraph 35, of this Complaint). Additionally, the Trustee has alleged that the Grosvenor Defendants “entered into subscription agreements with Fairfield Sentry under which they submitted to New York jurisdiction, sent copies of the agreements to FGG’s New York City office, and wired funds to Fairfield Sentry through a bank in New York” and “thus derived significant revenue from New York and maintained minimum contacts and/or general business contacts with the United States and New York in connection with the claims alleged herein.” (Compl. ¶ 7).

In response to the motion to dismiss, the Trustee has provided a copy of a share application, which is signed by William Dolan as Director of Grosvenor Balanced. (Hunt Decl., ex. 4, ECF No. 116). The share application incorporates the terms of the “Information

Memorandum dated June 30, 1994.” *Id.* The information memorandum dated June 30, 1994, in turn, states that Fairfield Sentry “will seek to achieve capital appreciation of its assets by allocating its assets to an account at Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities (‘BLM’), a registered broker-dealer in New York, New York, which employs an options trading strategy described as ‘split strike conversion.’” (Info. Mem., Hunt Decl., ex. 1, ECF No. 116). The information memorandum goes to state that “the Manager<sup>[4]</sup> has established a discretionary account for Sentry at Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities (‘BLM’), a registered broker-dealer in New York, New York . . . ” and that “[a]ll investment decisions in the account at BLM are effected by persons associated with BLM.” *Id.* The document continues: “BLM acts as a principal in connection with its sale of assets to the Company<sup>[5]</sup> and the purchase of securities from the Company. BLM acts as a market-maker in the stocks purchased and sold by the Company. These market-making activities enable BLM to trade with the Company as principal.” *Id.* Grosvenor Balanced acknowledged that it received and read this information memorandum in its share application. (Hunt Decl., ex. 4, ECF No. 116).

The Trustee has also provided a copy of a “short form subscription agreement” signed by Grosvenor Private that “reaffirms each and every representation and covenant made by the undersigned in the original subscription agreement.” (Hunt Decl., ex. 3, ECF No. 116). The subscription agreement states that the subscription agreement should be mailed to Fairfield Greenwich Limited at 399 Park Avenue, 36<sup>th</sup> Floor, New York, New York 10022-4690. *Id.* The subscription agreement also requires subscribers to wire transfer funds into a New York bank account in order to purchase shares in Fairfield Sentry. *Id.* The document also references Fairfield Sentry’s “private placement memorandum,” which states: “[t]he Fund will seek to

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<sup>4</sup> “Manager” is defined as “Fairfield Greenwich Limited” in the information memorandum.

<sup>5</sup> “Company” is defined as “Fairfield Sentry Limited” in the information memorandum.



achieve capital appreciation of its assets principally by allocating its assets to an account at Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, Inc. . . .” *Id.* The private placement memorandum states that Fairfield Greenwich Limited “is responsible for the management of the Fund’s investment activities, including allocation of the Fund’s assets to a managed account maintained at Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities Inc.” *Id.* And that the

Manager has established a discretionary account for the Fund at Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, Inc. (sometimes referred to as “BLM”), a registered broker-dealer in New York, who utilized a strategy described as the ‘split strike conversion’, to which it allocated the predominant portion of the Fund’s assets. . . . All investment decisions in the account at BLM are effected by persons associated with BLM

*Id.* The document also advises the Grosvenor Defendants, that Fairfield Greenwich Group maintains its principal office in New York. *Id.*

The Trustee has provided documents indicating that Grosvenor Management communicated regularly with Fairfield Greenwich Group’s New York office, via email and fax, on behalf of Grosvenor Private and Grosvenor Balanced. (Hunt Decl., ECF No. 116). For example, the Trustee has provided the Court with a copy of an email from wdolan@grosvenorasset.com to a Fairfield Greenwich Group employee with an email address ending @fggus.com. (Hunt Decl., ex. 11, ECF No. 116) (emphasis added to highlight “U.S.” email address). In that email, Mr. Dolan is invited to Fairfield Greenwich Group’s New York office. *Id.* In another email chain, Mr. Dolan contacts cheryl@fggus.com on behalf of Grosvenor Balanced and Grosvenor Private. (Hunt Decl., ex. 12, ECF No. 116) (emphasis added to highlight “U.S.” email address). In that email chain, he is requesting a copy of a “rebate agreement” between [Fairfield Sentry] and the Grosvenor Defendants from an employee at the New York office. *Id.* In another email chain, Fairfield Greenwich Group employees discuss knowing and speaking with Mr. Dolan and convincing him to stay invested in Fairfield Sentry—

rather than move his investments to a different BLMIS feeder fund. (Hunt Decl., ex. 13, ECF No. 116).

Grosvenor Private used a New York bank account to receive the redemption payments at issue here. (Hunt Decl., ex. 9, ECF No. 116). Grosvenor Private requested that redemptions of its shares in Fairfield Sentry be paid to its Deutsche Bank Trust Company America account and the bank's address was listed as "60 Wall Street, New York, NY USA." *Id.* Where a defendant chooses to use a United States bank account to received funds, exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant for causes of action relating to those transfers is constitutional. *Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Arcapita v. Bahrain Islamic Bank*, 549 B.R. 56, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); *Bahrain Islamic Bank v. Arcapita Bank (In re Arcapita Bank B.S.C.(C))*, 640 B.R. 604, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (a bank submits to personal jurisdiction in the United States when it is "free to accept or reject the proposed terms" and still chooses to use a United States bank account); *see also Eldesouky v. Aziz*, No. 11–CV–6986 (JLC), 2014 WL 7271219, at \*6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2014) (finding jurisdiction under New York long-arm statute based solely on defendant's use of New York account to receive payment at issue: "receiving Plaintiffs' money at a New York bank account suffices to establish personal jurisdiction over [Defendant]."); *HSH Nordbank AG N.Y. Branch v. Street*, No. 11 CIV. 9405 DLC, 2012 WL 2921875, at \*4 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2012)("District courts in this Circuit have upheld personal jurisdiction based upon a defendant's use of a correspondent bank account in New York where the use of that account was held to lay at the very root of the plaintiff's action.")(quoting *Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL*, 673 F.3d 50, 66 (2d Cir. 2012).); *Dandong v. Pinnacle Performance Ltd.*, 966 F. Supp.2d 374, 382–83 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (same).

The Complaint contains allegations that are legally sufficient to constitute a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. *Dorchester Fin. Securities Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A.*, 722 F.3d 81, 85 (2d. Cir. 2013). “[A]lthough physical presence in the forum is not a prerequisite to jurisdiction, physical entry into the State—either by the defendant in person or through an agent, goods, mail, or some other means—is certainly a relevant contact.” *Walden v. Fiore*, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014). Defendants “intentionally tossed a seed from abroad to take root and grow as a new tree in the Madoff money orchard in the United States and reap the benefits therefrom.” *Picard v. Bureau of Labor Ins. (In re BLMIS)*, 480 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). Defendant’s alleged contacts with New York are not random, isolated, or fortuitous.

#### **Arise out of or relate to the defendant’s forum conduct**

As to the second prong, the suit must “arise out of *or relate to* the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” *Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, \_\_\_ U.S. \_\_\_, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1026, 209 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2021) (emphasis in original). “[P]roof that a plaintiff’s claim came about because of the defendant’s in-state conduct” is not required. *Id.* at 1027. Instead, the court need only find “an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy.” *Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown*, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011); *Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS)*, 594 B.R. 167, 190 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Where the defendant’s contacts with the jurisdiction that relate to the cause of action are more substantial, however, it is not unreasonable to say that the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction even though the acts within the state are not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.”) (internal quotations omitted).

Here, the Trustee is asserting subsequent transfer claims against Defendants for monies they received from the Fairfield Sentry. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 54–58). These allegations are directly

related to their investment activities with BLMIS via Fairfield Sentry. *Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS)*, 594 B.R. 167, 191 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding that the redemption and other payments the defendants received as direct investors in a BLMIS feeder fund arose from the New York contacts such as sending subscription agreements to New York, wiring funds in U.S. dollars to New York, sending redemption requests to New York, and receiving redemption payments from a Bank of New York account in New York, and were the proximate cause of the injuries that the Trustee sought to redress).

The suit is affiliated with the alleged in-state conduct. *Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown*, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).

### **Reasonableness**

Having found sufficient minimum contacts, the Court must determine if exercising personal jurisdiction over the Defendants is reasonable and “comport[s] with fair play and substantial justice.” *Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz*, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (internal quotations omitted). Factors the Court may consider include the burden on the defendants, the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.

The exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. Defendants are not burdened by this litigation. Defendants actively participated in this Court’s litigation for over ten years. They are represented by U.S. counsel, held bank accounts in New York, and “irrevocably” submitted to the jurisdiction of New York courts’ when they signed subscription agreements with the Fairfield

Funds.<sup>6</sup> (Am. Compl. ¶ 5). The forum and the Trustee both have a strong interest in litigating BLMIS adversary proceedings in this Court. *Picard v. Maxam Absolute Return Fund, L.P. (In re BLMIS)*, 460 B.R. 106, 117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011), *aff'd*, 474 B.R. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); *Picard v. Chais (In re BLMIS)*, 440 B.R. 274, 278 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); *Picard v. Cohmad Sec. Corp. (In re BLMIS)*, 418 B.R. 75, 82 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); *Picard v. Fairfield Greenwich Grp., (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.)*, 627 B.R. 546, 568 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021); *see also In re Picard*, 917 F.3d 85, 103 (2d Cir. 2019) (“The United States has a compelling interest in allowing domestic estates to recover fraudulently transferred property.”).

By alleging that Defendants intentionally invested in BLMIS, the Trustee has met his burden of alleging jurisdiction as to each subsequent transfer that originated with BLMIS. And by alleging that Defendants used a New York bank account, the Trustee has met his burden of alleging jurisdiction over each transfer that received through that New York bank account.

As recognized by the Second Circuit, “[w]hen these [subsequent transfer] investors chose to buy into feeder funds that placed all or substantially all of their assets with Madoff Securities, they knew where their money was going.” *In re Picard*, 917 F.3d 85, 105 (2d Cir. 2019). The Trustee has made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction with respect to all of the Fairfield Funds subsequent transfers at issue in this Complaint.

### **12(b)(6) standard**

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<sup>6</sup> Even though this Court held that the Defendant’s consent to jurisdiction in New York courts contained in the subscription agreements it signed prior to investing with Fairfield Sentry could not be used as the sole basis for this Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over an action by foreign liquidators to recover redemption payments under British Virgin Island law, the fact that Defendant agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of this Court is certainly a relevant factor in determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over Defendant is reasonable. *In Fairfield Sentry v. Theodoor GGC Amsterdam (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.)*, Case No. 10-13164 (SMB), Adv. No. 10-03496 (SMB), 2018 WL 3756343, at \*12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2018) (“Defendants’ consent to the Subscription Agreement does not constitute consent to personal jurisdiction in the U.S. Redeemer Actions.”), *aff'd, Fairfield Sentry Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A. London*, No. 19-CV-3911 (VSB), 2022 WL 3644436, at \*9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2022).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). The claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads facts that allow the Court to draw a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Id.* “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” *Id.*; *see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (“Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court should assume the factual allegations are true and determine whether, when read together, they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief. *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679. “And, of course, a well-pl[ed] complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556.

In deciding the motion, “courts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” *Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.*, 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). A complaint is “deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit[,] . . . documents incorporated in it by reference[,]” and other documents “integral” to the complaint. *Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc.*, 282 F.3d 147, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). A document is “integral” to a complaint when the plaintiff has “actual notice” of the extraneous

information and relied on it in framing the complaint. *DeLuca v. AccessIT Grp., Inc.*, 695 F. Supp. 2d 54, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing *Chambers*, 282 F.3d at 153).

The Trustee is seeking to recover subsequent transfers made to Defendants by Fairfield Sentry.

### **Recovery of Subsequent Transfers**

Pursuant to § 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee is entitled to recover avoided transfers of customer property from initial transferees as well as from “any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.” 11 U.S.C. § 550(a). “To plead a subsequent transfer claim, the Trustee must plead that the initial transfer is avoidable, and the defendant is a subsequent transferee of that initial transferee, that is, that the funds at issue originated with the debtor.” *Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS)*, 594 B.R. 167, 195 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018); *see also SIPC v. BLMIS (In re Consol. Proc. On 11 U.S.C. § 546(e))*, No. 12 MC 115, 2013 WL 1609154, at \*7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2013). “Federal Civil Rule 9(b) governs the portion of a claim to avoid an initial intentional fraudulent transfer and Rule 8(a) governs the portion of a claim to recover the subsequent transfer.” *BNP Paribas*, 594 B.R. at 195 (citing *Sharp Int’l Corp. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., (In re Sharp Int’l Corp.)*, 403 F.3d 43, 56 (2d Cir. 2005).

The Trustee only needs to provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The plaintiff’s burden at the pleading stage does not require exact accounting of the funds at issue. *BNP Paribas*, 594 B.R. at 195. Rather “[t]he plaintiff must allege the necessary vital statistics – the who, when, and how much – of the purported transfers to establish an entity as a subsequent transferee of the funds.” *Id.* However, the plaintiff’s burden at the pleading stage does not require dollar-for-dollar

accounting of the exact funds at issue.” *Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS)*, 594 B.R. 167, 195 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018).

While the Trustee must allege that the initial transfer from BLMIS to Fairfield Sentry is avoidable, he is not required to avoid the transfer received by the initial transferee before asserting an action against subsequent transferees. *IBT Int’l Inc. v. Northern (In re Int’l Admin Servs., Inc.)*, 408 F.3d 689, 706-07 (11th Cir. 2005). The Trustee is free to pursue any of the immediate or mediate transferees, and nothing in the statute requires a different result. *IBT Int’l, Inc. v. Northern (In re Int’l Admin. Servs., Inc.)*, 408 F.3d 689, 706-07 (11th Cir. 2005).

The Trustee pleaded the avoidability of the initial transfer (from BLMIS to Fairfield Sentry) by adopting by reference the entirety of the complaint filed against Fairfield Sentry in adversary proceeding 09-1239 (“Fairfield Complaint”). (Am. Compl. ¶ 35). Whether the Fairfield Complaint properly pleads the avoidability of the initial transfer, is governed by Rule 9(b). Rule 9(b) states: “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

Where the actual fraudulent transfer claim is asserted by a bankruptcy trustee, applicable Second Circuit precedent instructs courts to adopt a more liberal view since a trustee is an outsider to the transaction who must plead fraud from second-hand knowledge. Moreover, in a case such as this one, where the Trustee’s lack of personal knowledge is compounded with complicated issues and transactions that extend over lengthy periods of time, the trustee’s handicap increases, and even greater latitude should be afforded.

*Picard v. Cohmad Secs. Corp., (In re BLMIS)*, 454 B.R. 317, 329 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (cleaned up).

### **Adoption by Reference**

Adoption by reference is governed by Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). Rule 10(c) states: “A statement in a pleading may be adopted by reference



elsewhere in the same pleading or in any other pleading or motion.” The district court has already found that adoption by reference of the entire Fairfield Complaint is proper. *See SIPC v. BLMIS (In re Consolidated Proceedings on 11 U.S.C. § 550(a))*, 501 B.R. 26, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The Trustee’s complaint against Standard Chartered Financial Services incorporates by reference the complaints against Kingate and Fairfield, including the allegations concerning the avoidability of the initial transfers, and further alleges the avoidability of these transfers outright. Thus, the avoidability of the transfers from Madoff Securities to Kingate and Fairfield is sufficiently pleaded for purposes of section 550(a).”) (cleaned up).

The Court will follow the district court’s instruction. As was explained in *In re Geiger*, pleadings filed in the “same action” may be properly adopted by reference in other pleadings in that action. 446 B.R. 670, 679 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010). The Fairfield Complaint was filed in the “same action” as this adversary proceeding for purposes of Rule 10(c). *Id.* Cases within this SIPA proceeding are filed in the same “proceeding”—the SIPA proceeding. *In re Terrestar Corp.*, No. 16 CIV. 1421 (ER), 2017 WL 1040448, at \*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2017) (“Adversary proceedings filed in the same bankruptcy case do not constitute different cases.”); *see also Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC*, 610 B.R. 197, 237 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“The prior decisions within this SIPA proceeding constitute law of the case . . . .”); *Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC*, 603 B.R. 682, 700 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019), (citing *In re Motors Liquidation Co.*, 590 B.R. 39, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (law of the case doctrine applies across adversary proceedings within the same main case), *aff’d*, 943 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2019)); *Perez v. Terrastar Corp. (In re Terrestar Corp.)*, No. 16 Civ. 1421 (ER), 2017 WL 1040448, at \*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2017) (“Adversary proceedings filed in the same bankruptcy case do not constitute different cases.”), *appeal dismissed*, No. 17-1117 (2d Cir. June 29, 2017);

*Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. Montagne (In re Montagne)*, No. 08-1024 (CAB), 2010 WL 271347, at \*6 (Bankr. D. Vt. Jan. 22, 2010) (“[D]ifferent adversary proceedings in the same main case do not constitute different ‘cases.’”).

Some courts have worried that wholesale incorporation of a pleading can lead to “confusing and inconvenient” results. *Hinton v. Trans Union, LLC*, 654 F. Supp. 2d 440, 446–47 (E.D. Va. 2009) (footnote omitted), *aff’d*, 382 F. App’x 256 (4th Cir. 2010). That is not a concern in these proceedings. The Grosvenor Defendants, like many subsequent transfer defendants in this SIPA proceeding, are aware of what has been filed in the other adversary proceeding in this SIPA liquidation. They routinely follow what is happening on a proceeding-wide basis. *See* Stip., ECF No. 89 (dismissing adversary proceeding based on consolidated extraterritoriality ruling).

Allowing the Trustee to incorporate the Fairfield Complaint by reference, does not prejudice Defendants. If the Court were to dismiss this Complaint and permit the Trustee to amend his Complaint to include all of the allegations that are already contained in the Fairfield Complaint, all parties would be prejudiced by delay in these already, overly-prolonged proceedings. *See Picard v. Fairfield Inv. Fund (In re BLMIS)*, No. 08-01789 (CGM), Adv. No. 09-01239 (CGM), 2021 WL 3477479, at \*4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2021) (“Rule 15 places no time bar on making motions to amend pleadings and permits the amending of pleadings “when justice so requires.”).

Through the adoption of the Fairfield Complaint, the Trustee has adequately pleaded, with particularity, the avoidability of the initial transfer due to Fairfield Sentry’s knowledge of BLMIS’ fraud. (Fairfield Compl. ¶¶ 314–318, 09-01239, ECF No. 286); *see also SIPC v. BLMIS (In re Consolidated Proceedings on 11 U.S.C. § 550(a))*, 501 B.R. 26, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)

(“[T]he Court directs that the following adversary proceedings be returned to the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order . . .”).

Defendants argue that the wholesale adoption of the Fairfield Complaint violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires a “short and plain statement of [a] claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Court disagrees. Defendants have been following this and the Fairfield Sentry chapter 15 case and have been familiar with the allegations contained in the Fairfield Complaint for over a decade. Indeed, Defendants have been privy to information that this Court has not seen. Fairfield Sentry has a complicated<sup>7</sup> corporate structure with various insiders many of whom are alleged to have had knowledge of BLMIS’ fraud. The Trustee would need to re-plead nearly the entire Fairfield Complaint to demonstrate that the initial transfer is voidable. This Court has reviewed the Fairfield Complaint, in detail, on numerous occasions, and there is not much of that document that could be omitted. Insisting that the Trustee re-allege all of the allegations contained in the Fairfield Complaint is unnecessary, burdensome, and duplicative.

### **The Safe Harbor does not bar the avoidance of the Fairfield Initial Transfers**

Defendants have raised the “safe harbor” defense, found in § 546(e), to the Trustee’s allegations. Section 546(e) is referred to as the safe harbor because it protects a transfer that is a “settlement payment ... made by or to (or for the benefit of) a ... financial institution [or] financial participant,” or that is “made by or to (or for the benefit of) a ... financial institution [or] financial participant ... in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e). “By its terms, the safe harbor is a defense to the avoidance of the *initial* transfer.” *Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS)*, 594 B.R. 167, 197 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (emphasis in original).

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<sup>7</sup> In a related adversary proceeding, *Picard v. Fairfield Greenwich Group, et al.*, 10-03800-cgm, the Court asked the parties to provide it with a chart showing the relationships of the Fairfield entities. The Court received three different charts. See Feb. 12, 2021 Hr’ Tr. at 51:9-10, *Picard v. Fairfield Greenwich Grp., et al.*, 10-03800-cgm, ECF No. 158 (“I ask you all for charts and ended up with three.”).

Where the initial transferee fails to raise a § 546(e) defense against the Trustee's avoidance of certain transfers, as is the case here, the subsequent transferee is entitled to raise a § 546(e) defense against recovery of those funds. *Picard v. Fairfield Inv. Fund (In re BLMIS)*, No. 08-01789 (CGM), Adv. No. 09-01239 (CGM), 2021 WL 3477479, at \*3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2021).

On the issue of the safe harbor, the Court adopts the district court's reasoning in: *Picard v. Multi-Strategy Fund Ltd. (In re BLMIS)*, No. 22-CV-06502 (JSR), 2022 WL 16647767 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2022).

The Trustee has alleged that Fairfield Sentry knew the payments it received from BLMIS were neither settlement payments nor payments in connection with a securities contract. "The safe harbor was intended, among other things, to promote the reasonable expectations of legitimate investors. If an investor knew that BLMIS was not actually trading securities, he had no reasonable expectation that he was signing a contract with BLMIS for the purpose of trading securities for his account. In that event, the Trustee can avoid and recover preferences and actual and constructive fraudulent transfers to the full extent permitted under state and federal law." *Picard v. Legacy Capital Ltd. (In re BLMIS)*, 548 B.R. 13, 28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (internal citations omitted), *vacated and remanded on other grounds, Picard v. Citibank, N.A. (In re BLMIS)*, 12 F.4<sup>th</sup> 171 (2d Cir. 2021).

The district court determined that "those defendants who claim the protections of Section 546(e) through a Madoff Securities account agreement but who actually knew that Madoff Securities was a Ponzi scheme are not entitled to the protections of the Section 546(e) safe harbor, and their motions to dismiss the Trustee's claims on this ground must be denied." *SIPC v. BLMIS (In re Consolidated Proceedings on 11 U.S.C. § 546(e))*, No. 12 MC 115(JSR), 2013

WL 1609154, at \*10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2013 *see also Picard v. Multi-Strategy Fund Ltd. (In re BLMIS)*, No. 22-CV-06502 (JSR), 2022 WL 16647767, at \*7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2022) (“[I]n circumstances in which a transferee was complicit in Madoff Securities’ fraud, Section 546(e) d[oes] not apply as a matter of its express terms.”).

This Court is powerless to reconsider this issue, agrees with the district court’s reasoning, and finds its holding consistent with *dicta* set forth by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. *See Picard v. Ida Fishman Revocable Trust (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC)*, 773 F.3d 411, 420 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The clawback defendants, having every reason to believe that BLMIS was actually engaged in the business of effecting securities transactions, have every right to avail themselves of all the protections afforded to the clients of stockbrokers, including the protection offered by § 546(e).”).

This Court has already determined that the Fairfield Complaint<sup>8</sup> contains sufficient allegations of Fairfield Sentry’s actual knowledge to defeat the safe harbor defense on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. *See Picard v. Fairfield Inv. Fund (In re BLMIS)*, No. 08-01789 (CGM), Adv. No. 09-01239 (CGM), 2021 WL 3477479, at \*4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2021) (“[T]he Trustee has alleged that the agents and principals of the Fairfield Funds had actual knowledge of Madoff’s fraud”). In that adversary proceeding, the Court held that “[t]he Trustee has pled [actual] knowledge in two ways: 1) that certain individuals had actual knowledge of Madoff’s fraud, which is imputed to the Fairfield Funds; and 2) that actual knowledge is imputed to the Fairfield Funds through ‘FGG,’ an alleged ‘de facto’ partnership.” *Id.* at \*4; *see also* Fairfield Compl. ¶ 320 (“Fairfield Sentry had actual knowledge of the fraud at BLMIS”); Fairfield Compl. ¶ 321 (“Greenwich Sentry and Greenwich Sentry Partners had actual knowledge of the fraud at BLMIS”); Fairfield Compl. ¶ 322 (“FIFL had actual knowledge of the fraud at BLMIS”);

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<sup>8</sup> The Fairfield Complaint can be found on the docket of adversary number 09-01239-cgm, ECF No. 286.

Fairfield Compl. ¶ 323 (“Stable Fund had actual knowledge of the fraud at BLMIS”); Fairfield Compl. ¶ 324 (“FG Limited had actual knowledge of the fraud at BLMIS”); Fairfield Compl. ¶ 325 (“FG Bermuda had actual knowledge of the fraud at BLMIS”); ¶ 326 (“FG Advisors had actual knowledge of the fraud at BLMIS”); Fairfield Compl. ¶ 327 (“Fairfield International Managers had actual knowledge of the fraud at BLMIS”); Fairfield Compl. ¶ 328 (“FG Capital had actual knowledge of the fraud at BLMIS”); Fairfield Compl. ¶ 329 (“Share Management had actual knowledge of the fraud at BLMIS”); Fairfield Compl. ¶ 9 (“It is inescapable that FGG partners knew BLMIS was not trading securities. They knew BLMIS’s returns could not be the result of the split strike conversion strategy (the “SSC Strategy”). They knew BLMIS’s equities and options trading volumes were impossible. They knew that BLMIS reported impossible, out-of-range trades, which almost always were in Madoff’s favor. They knew Madoff’s auditor was not certified and lacked the ability to audit BLMIS. They knew BLMIS did not use an independent broker or custodian. They knew Madoff refused to identify any of BLMIS’s options counterparties. They knew their clients and potential clients raised numerous due diligence questions they would not and could not satisfactorily answer. They knew Madoff would refuse to provide them with honest answers to due diligence questions because it would confirm the details of his fraud. They knew Madoff lied about whether he traded options over the counter or through the exchange. They knew they lied to clients about BLMIS’s practices in order to keep the money flowing and their fees growing. And they knowingly misled the SEC at Madoff’s direction.”).

“In sum, if the Trustee sufficiently alleges that the [initial] transferee from whom he seeks to recover a fraudulent transfer knew of [BLMIS ]’[s] fraud, that transferee cannot claim

the protections of Section 546(e)'s safe harbor.” *Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC*, No. 08-01789 (CGM), 2021 WL 3477479, at \*4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2021).

This Court determined that the Fairfield Complaint is replete with allegations demonstrating that Fairfield Sentry had actual knowledge that BLMIS was not trading securities. *See Picard v. Fairfield Inv. Fund (In re BLMIS)*, No. 08-01789(CGM), Adv. No. 09-01239 (CGM), 2021 WL 3477479, at \*3–\*7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2021). The Trustee’s allegations in the Fairfield Complaint are sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on this issue.

Defendants raise *Fairfield III* in support of their argument that the safe harbor should bar these claims. *Fairfield Sentry Ltd. V. Theodoor GGC Amsterdam (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.)*, No. 10-13164 (SMB), 2020 WL 7345988, at \*5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2020) (“*Fairfield III*”), *aff’d sub nom. Fairfield Sentry Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A. London*, No. 19-CV-3911 (VSB), 2022 WL 4391023 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2022). In *Fairfield III*, this Court applied the safe harbor to redemption payments made by Fairfield Sentry to its shareholders. *Fairfield III* is inapplicable in this case for two reasons. First, and most obviously, *Fairfield III* is a holding in Fairfield Sentry’s chapter 15 case, which is not binding on the Court in this adversary proceeding; whereas the district court’s decision in *SIPC v. BLMIS (In re Consolidated Proceedings on 11 U.S.C. § 546(e))*, No. 12 MC 115(JSR), 2013 WL 1609154, at \*10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2013), which holds that the safe harbor does not apply in this case, is binding on the Court on this issue. Second, the issue in *Fairfield III* is not comparable. In *Fairfield III*, the Court found that the plaintiffs had not met their pleading burden because the complaint stated that Fairfield Sentry did **not** have knowledge of BLMIS’ fraud and the plaintiffs were not permitted to amend their complaints. *Fairfield III*, 2020 WL 7345988, at \*9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2020) (“[T]he Citibank Complaint *alleges* that the [Fairfield] Funds were duped,

believing that their BLMIS investments were worth what the BLMIS monthly statements showed. The Funds were the transferors and if they were duped, they could not have intended to ‘hinder, delay or defraud’ the Funds’ other creditors by redeeming investments at prices they believed to be accurate.”) (emphasis added). In *Fairfield III*, Fairfield Sentry was the initial transferor, not the initial transferee as it is here. And the Court did not rule on whether the “knowledge exception” to the safe harbor applied. Here, the Trustee has sufficiently plead Fairfield Sentry’s actual knowledge that BLMIS was not trading securities.

Whether the safe harbor applies to the initial transfers under the theory that BLMIS’ transfers to Fairfield Sentry were made in connection with Fairfield Sentry’s contracts with Defenants (rather than Fairfield Sentry’s contract with BLMIS) is not answerable on the pleadings. If such a fact-specific determination is needed, the Court will make it with the benefit of a “full factual record.” *Picard v. Multi-Strategy Fund Ltd. (In re BLMIS)*, No. 22-CV-06502 (JSR), 2022 WL 16647767, at \*24 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2022)

### **The Safe Harbor cannot be used to defeat a subsequent transfer**

The safe harbor cannot be used to prevent the Trustee from avoiding the subsequent transfer between Fairfield Sentry and Defendants on account of the securities contracts between Fairfield Sentry and Defendants.

The safe harbor is not applicable to subsequent transfers. “By its terms, the safe harbor is a defense to the avoidance of the *initial* transfer.” *Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS)*, 594 B.R. 167, 197 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (emphasis in original); *see also* 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (failing to include § 550 in its protections). Since there must be an initial transfer in order for the Trustee to collect against a subsequent transferee, a subsequent transferee may raise the safe harbor as a defense—but only in so far as the avoidance of the initial transfer is concerned. The



safe harbor cannot be used as a defense by the subsequent transferee because the Trustee is not “avoiding” a subsequent transfer, “he recovers the value of the avoided initial transfer from the subsequent transferee under 11 U.S.C. § 550(a), and the safe harbor does not refer to the recovery claims under section 550.” *Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS)*, 594 B.R. 167, 197 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018).

To the extent that the Defendants argue that *Fairfield III* is applicable to subsequent transfers, reliance on this case is misplaced. While many facts overlap between this SIPA liquidation of BLMIS and the foreign liquidation of BLMIS’s largest feeder fund, Fairfield Sentry, the legal holdings in these liquidations are not interchangeable. In this case, the Court is analyzing subsequent transfers; in *Fairfield III* the Court was analyzing initial transfers. The safe harbor is not available to be raised as defense to subsequent transfer claims.

In *Fairfield III*, this Court analyzed whether the safe harbor applied to avoidance claims under BVI law[1] to recover “unfair preferences,” “undervalue transactions,” and constructive trust claims against a defendant who allegedly “knew or willfully blinded itself to the fact that the [Fairfield Sentry’s] BLMIS investments were worthless or virtually worthless.” *In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.*, No. 10-13164 (SMB), 2020 WL 7345988, at \*1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2020), *reconsideration denied*, No. 10-13164 (SMB), 2021 WL 771677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2021). The Court was not considering the safe harbor’s effect on subsequent transfer claims brought under § 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. *Fairfield III* is not applicable here either.

### **BLMIS Customer Property**

The Trustee has pleaded that “[b]ased on the Trustee’s investigation to date, approximately \$13,000,000 of the money transferred from BLMIS to Fairfield Sentry was

subsequently transferred by Fairfield Sentry to Grosvenor Balanced and/or Grosvenor Management.” (Compl. ¶ 46). Approximately \$14,315,101 of the money transferred from BLMIS to Fairfield Sentry was subsequently transferred by Fairfield Sentry to Grosvenor Private and Grosvenor Management. (Compl. ¶ 48).

Exhibit D to the Complaint shows two subsequent transfers from Fairfield Sentry to Grosvenor Balanced: \$8 million on 3/15/2005 and \$5 million on 12/19/2005. Exhibit E to the Complaint shows five<sup>9</sup> subsequent transfers from Fairfield Sentry to Grosvenor Private: \$500,000 on 10/14/2005; \$1,312,804 on 12/19/2005; \$5,000,000 on 12/19/2005; \$2,298 on 3/17/2006; and \$5,000,000 on 7/19/2007. These exhibits provide the Grosvenor Defendants with the “who, when, and how much” of each transfer. *Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS)*, 594 B.R. 167, 195 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018).

The Defendants argue that this Court must consider all of the subsequent transfer cases pending before it in order to determine whether allegations in this Complaint are feasible. It is alleged that Fairfield Sentry received only \$3 billion in transfers from BLMIS. Yet, if one were to total all of the alleged subsequent transfers across all of these BLMIS adversary proceedings, the Trustee has alleged that Fairfield Sentry paid out approximately \$5 billion. Defendants have asserted that the money they received from Fairfield Sentry is untainted money that never was invested with BLMIS simply because the Trustee has filed complaints against other defendants who may have taken the money first.

To consider allegations made in dozens of other complaints filed by the Trustee in this SIPA proceeding is impractical and not required at this stage of the litigation. The other complaints have not been adopted by reference by the Trustee in this adversary proceeding and,

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<sup>9</sup> The Trustee is no longer seeking to recovery the transfer of \$2,500,000 on April 14, 2003. Stip. & Order, ECF No. 118.

as such, are not within the Court's power to consider on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. *Williams v. Time Warner Inc.*, 440 F. App'x 7, 9 (2d Cir. 2011) ("A district court, in deciding whether to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), is generally limited to the facts as presented within the four corners of the complaint, to documents attached to the complaint, or to documents incorporated within the complaint by reference.") (citing *Taylor v. Vt. Dep't of Educ.*, 313 F.3d 768, 776 (2d Cir. 2002)).

In order to determine how Fairfield Sentry spent the billions of dollars it received from BLMIS, this Court would need review financial documents in order to trace the monies to all of Fairfield Sentry's principals, insiders, creditors, and customers. Undoubtedly, the Court will trace and calculate how Fairfield Sentry spent its BLMIS (and any non-BLMIS) funds at a later stage of litigation. At this stage, the Trustee need only assert allegations that make it seem plausible that Defendant received BLMIS monies.

The Fairfield Complaint, which is incorporated by reference into this, alleges that the Fairfield Fund was required to invest 95% of its assets in BLMIS. (Fairfield Compl. ¶ 89); *see also* (Fairfield Compl. ¶ 91) ("From the beginning, to comport with Madoff's requirement for BLMIS feeder funds, Fairfield Sentry ceded control of not only its investment decisions, but also the custody of its assets, to BLMIS."). The Complaint plausibly alleges that Fairfield Sentry did not have any assets that were not customer property. In this case, the Trustee is not seeking to collect \$5 billion from the Grosvenor Defendants. He is seeking only \$24,815,101, which easily could come from the \$3 billion Fairfield received from BLMIS. If the Court were to accept Defendants' argument, it would need to do one of two things: 1) dismiss ALL of the Trustee's subsequent transfer claims in all of the adversary proceedings since the Court has no idea which transfers came from BLMIS customer property; or 2) hold a pre-discovery trial on all of the

subsequent transfers actions to determine which transfers were made from the \$3 billion of BLMIS customer property and which were not. The Court is simply not willing to have such a trial at this stage of litigation.

Taking all allegations as true and reading them in a light most favorable to the Trustee, the Complaint plausibly pleads that Defendants received customer property because Fairfield Sentry did not have other property to give. The calculation of Fairfield Sentry's customer property and what funds it used to make redemption payments are issues of fact better resolved at a later stage of litigation.

To the extent that Defendants are worried about the Trustee recovering more than he is entitled, such a fear is unfounded. There is no dispute that the Trustee is limited to "a single satisfaction" under § 550(a). 11 U.S.C. § 550(d). He may nevertheless pursue any and all subsequent transferees in order to achieve that satisfaction. § 550(a)(2) (providing that the Trustee may recover property from "any immediate or mediate transferee"). Calculation of whether the Trustee is fully satisfied is a factual finding to be made by this Court at a later stage of litigation.

### **Conclusion**

For the foregoing reasons, the Grosvenor Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied. The Trustee shall submit a proposed order within fourteen days of the issuance of this decision, directly to chambers (via E-Orders), upon not less than two days' notice to all parties, as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9074-1(a).

**Dated: November 21, 2022**  
**Poughkeepsie, New York**



**/s/ Cecelia G. Morris**

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**Hon. Cecelia G. Morris**  
**U.S. Bankruptcy Judge**