## Exhibit A

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        UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
        SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
IN RE
    * Case No. 95-1415
WEST PAN, INC., * New York, New York
    Plaintiff, *
    December 14, 2005
    V. *
MARTHA PERRY
MARTHA PERRY, et al. *
Defendants. *
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE ARTHUR J. GONZALEZ
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
(As corrected and modified by the Court
                                    December 28, 2005)
APPEARANCES:
For West Pan, Inc.:
ARNOLD WEISS, ESQ.
The Weiss Law Firm, P.C.
6 0 0 ~ M a d i s o n ~ A v e n u e ~
New York, NY 10022
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For Alvin Trenk:

For Martha Perry:

PHILIP ROSENBAUCH, ESQ. Berman Rosenbach, P.C. 10 Madison Avenue P.O. Box 1916 Morristown, NJ 07962

STEPHEN BALSAMO, ESQ. Garrity, Graham, Favetta \& Flinn

One Lackawanna Plaza Montclair, NJ 07642

Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

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(Proceedings commenced at 10:59 a.m.)
THE COURT: All right. With respect to West Pan, are the parties on the phone?

MR. WEISS: Yes, Your Honor. Mr. Weiss.
THE COURT: Anyone else on the phone?
(No response.)
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Weiss, I'll take a brief recess. Would you contact counsel for Martha Perry, as well as counsel for Mr. Trenk, and see if there's any confusion about the scheduling, because I would prefer to read this decision into the record with them appearing either by phone or in person.

MR. WEISS: Sure. I'll do that, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And if necessary, I can put this off until sometime tomorrow and read it into the record.

MR. WEISS: Okay. I will call them and I'll get back to you at this same number.

THE COURT: All right. Yes.
MR. WEISS: I'll get right back to you.
(Pause.)
THE COURT: Please be seated. Who is on the phone?

MR. WEISS: Hello.
THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Weiss. Who else is on the phone?

MR. ROSENBAUCH: Phil Rosenbach, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. I can't hear you. MR. BALSAMO: Your Honor, Stephen Balsamo from Garrity Graham.

MR. ROSENBAUCH: Judge, this is one of these instances where we have a connection hooked to a connection.

THE COURT: All right. I don't know if there was some confusion from my chambers. I know I think we advised Mr. Weiss -- and we may have assumed that Mr. Weiss was going to tell the other parties. I don't particularly think that we may have actually asked them to do so, so maybe that explains why Mr. Trenk's counsel and Ms. Perry's counsel were not on the phone earlier.

MR. ROSENBAUCH: I think that's what happened.
THE COURT: All right.
"Upon motion by defendant, Martha Perry
Feldman and subsequently joined by defendant, Alvin Trenk, this court has been asked to dismiss its award of punitive damages, subject to subsequent hearing to determine those damages arising from the court's Memorandum Decision issued on August $22^{\text {nd }}, 2003$ in the West Pan, Inc. vs. Martha Perry, Alvin Trenk, Pizza Piazza, et al.

In that decision, this court awarded $\$ 1.00$ as nominal damages under West Pan, Inc.'s tortious interference with contract theory, finding that plaintiff West Pan had failed to establish that it is entitled to any actual damages under its complaint.

Subject to a subsequent hearing, this court also awarded punitive damages to plaintiff West Pan for defendant's tortious conduct."

It is prior to that hearing that this motion was made.
"As a procedural matter, pursuant to Rule 7052, 9014, 9023 of Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and pursuant to Southern District of New York Local Bankruptcy Rules, this court will reconsider its findings contained in its August $22^{\text {nd }}, 2003$ decision. This reconsideration is based on the substantial need to correct the Court's findings regarding New Jersey law in it's August $22^{\text {nd }}, 2003$ decision.

In their motions to dismiss punitive damages, the defendants argued, that as a matter of New Jersey law, actual damages are required -are a required element of tortious interference with contract complaints.

The defendants argue that because this court
did not find any actual damage to plaintiff West Pan based on its tortious interference complaint, as a matter of law, the tortious interference complaint must fail and, therefore, cannot support any award for punitive damages. This particular argument was not included in the briefs submitted by either party in the original complaint, nor was it included in defendant Trenk's original brief in opposition to punitive damages.

Under New Jersey case law applicable to the instant issue, 'one who unjustifiably interferes with the contract of another is guilty of a wrong.'

I will not read the citations into the record, but before this is transcribed, $I$ will give a copy to the transcriber what $I^{\prime}$ ve read from that contains the citations and I will review this decision for its accuracy, et cetera, before it is ultimately issued as a certified transcript of this morning's proceeding.
"As the case law indicates, New Jersey has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts definition of tortious interference with an existing contract, which requires the complaint to allege actual damage suffered by the
plaintiff.
As the parties to the current controversy have previously pointed out, in certain specific situations where there is an aggravated intentional tort accompanied by wanton and willful disregard of the rights of another, the New Jersey Supreme Court has been willing to aware punitive damages even without a finding of actual damages. For example, In re Nappe v. Anchelewitz, Barr, Ansell \& Bonello, 97 N.J.37, 477 A.2d 1224(1984) and Smith v. Whitaker, 160 N.J. 221, 734 A.2d 243,252(1999), the New Jersey Supreme Court explained that it has been their policy to allow punitive damages to punish the offender for clearly egregious, tortious conduct.

This Court notes that in 1995, the New Jersey State Legislature amended the Punitive Damages Act to require an award of compensatory damages as a statutory predicate for an award of punitive damages and disallows nominal damages as a basis for a punitive damages claim. NJSA 2A:15-5.13(c). That provision did not take effect until October $27^{\text {th }}, 1995$ and thus does not govern the instant matter.

In Nappe, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that actual damages are not a required element of an egregious intentional fraud where the plaintiff 'suffers some loss, detriment, or injury' in connection with the tort. 97 N.J. at 47-48, 477 A.2d at 1229. In Smith v. Whittaker, 160 N.J. 221, 734 A. 2 d243,252(1999), the New Jersey Supreme Court, further explaining their reasoning in Nappe, held that where there is a substantial legal injury due to a defendant's aggravated and egregious tortious conduct, 'nominal damages supporting a claim of punitive damages, may be awarded to vindicate the invasion of plaintiff's rights.' Id. At 252. The Smith court explained that in a case of intentional tort, 'the true loss, injury and detriment' suffered by plaintiff is not necessarily coextensive with the compensatory damages awarded, which is merely a monetary amount awarded in court to compensate or indemnify a plaintiff.' Id. at 252 citing Nappe v. Anchelewitz, Barr, Ansell \& Bonello, 97 N.J. 41 n. 1,477 A. 2d 1224 (1984).

While the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed for punitive damage awards without the finding of
actual damages in both Smith and Nappe, it has greatly limited the extension of this policy to only certain types of egregious intentional torts. Both Nappe and Smith are clearly distinguished from the current case. In Nappe, the New Jersey Supreme Court had to decide whether actual damage is a required element for the tort of legal fraud and if not, 'whether punitive damages may be awarded in the absence of a compensatory damage award in an action for legal fraud' (emphasis added). Nappe at 1226. The Nappe court did not extend its holding on legal fraud to all other intentional torts. In Smith, the New Jersey Supreme Court was dealing with the special circumstances under New Jersey's Survival Act. In that case, motorist Helen Robbins had died instantly when hit by defendant's negligently maintained truck. Smith at 246. Because Robbins died instantly and had not experienced conscious pain and suffering, the jury had not been able to award compensatory damages under New Jersey's Survival Act. The question for the New Jersey Supreme Court in Smith was 'whether a plaintiff's inability to establish conscientious pain and suffering in a
survival action involving instantaneous death bars a claim for punitive damages.' Smith at 251. The court decided that the specific factual details of Robbins' death and the legal limit on compensatory damages to victims without conscious pain and suffering should not bar plaintiff from recovering punitive damages. Id.

The New Jersey Supreme Court has also specifically treated tortious interference with contract complaints differently than the intentional fraud (Nappe) and the Survival Act complaints (Smith), holding that actual compensatory damages are a required element of the tortious interference complaint. See Printing Mart vs. Sharp Electronics, 563 A.2d 31, 37 (N.J. 1989). In Printing Mart, decided after both Nappe and Smith, the New Jersey Supreme Court implicitly distinguished that plaintiff's tortious interference complaint from intentional fraud complaint in Nappe. In Printing Mart, the Court specifically held that tortious interference complaints did require actual damage as an essential element, while in Nappe, the New Jersey Supreme Court had treated intentional fraud differently, finding that
actual damage was not a required element of the tort. Printing Mart v. Sharp Electronics, 563 A. $2 \mathrm{~d} 31,37$ (N.J. 1989).

This distinction for tortious interference complaints has previously been examined and reinforced by other courts. In Norwood Easthill Associates v. Norwood Easthill Watch, 222 N.J. Super. 385,536 A.2d 1320 (N.J. Super A.D. 1988), the plaintiff sought an award of punitive damages on top of nominal damages in its tortious interference complaint, but could not demonstrate that it had incurred any actual damage because of the defendant's interference with a contract.

Just as West Pan argues before this court, the plaintiff in Norwood argued that, despite" -there it was their inability to prove, whereas here the (Court's finding of no actual damages, I realized that West Pan disagrees with the Court's finding of no actual damages) -- "it should still could be able to obtain punitive damages under the authority of Nappe, Id. At 1321. Citing New Jersey case law, as well as the $2^{\text {nd }}$ Restatement, the Norwood court explained that due to the fact that 'plaintiff cannot show any injury, loss or detriment reasonably attributable to defendant's
alleged malicious interference,' it must reject plaintiff's position on the issue of punitive damages. Id.

Other courts have followed the same logic when interpreting New Jersey law. In Lighting Tube, Inc. vs. Witco Corp., 4F.3d 1153 (3d Cir. 1993) the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reinforced the distinction between the Nappe line of cases and the complaints based on tortious interference, finding that the Nappe line of cases purely address the tort of intentional fraud. As the Third Circuit decision indicated, 'the New Jersey Supreme Court does not appear to have extended [Nappe] to the cause of action of tortious interference.' Lighting Lube at 1168 n. 7.

In another case focused on this issue, Matrix Essential, Inc. V. Cosmetic Gallery, Inc., the plaintiff (Matrix), citing Nappe, argued that it need not establish any actual damages as an element of its tortious interference with contract claim. Matrix at 1249.

Arguing that tortious interference is an 'intentional tort,' Matrix argued that it therefore fell under Nappe line of cases and did
not require proof of compensatory damages. Id. As was in the case of Lighting Lube, in Matrix, the U.S. District Court found the Nappe line of cases did not govern its inquiry because Nappe has specifically addressed the intentional -- the tort of intentional fraud. The Matrix court concluded 'thus, we hold that damages are an essential element of Matrix's tortious interference claim and Matrix has utterly failed to prove any damages.' Id.

Upon reconsideration, this court concludes that actual damage is a required element of tortious interference with the contract complaints under New Jersey law. In this court's Memorandum Decision dated August 22nd 2003 , the Court found that the plaintiff West Pan, Inc. had failed to establish that it suffered any actual damages under its tortious interference with contract complaint. After reconsideration, the Court reiterates that West Pan has failed to prove actual damages arising from the defendant's interference with the contract. Therefore, this Court finds that plaintiff, West Pan, has failed to meet this required element of tortious interference with the contract complaint under

New Jersey law. Based on this finding, this Court dismisses West Pan's tortious interference complaint and will not award plaintiff either compensatory or punitive damages.

Furthermore, based on the court's ruling, there is no reason to address the argument raised in Mr. Trenk's original brief in opposition to punitive damages.'

Ms. Perry's counsel is directed to -- following receipt of the transcript, to settle an order consistent with this court's decision. It is my understanding that that order will be the final order in the West Pan adversary proceeding, that then will be subject to appeal by the parties to the district court, because this ruling today closes out, from my perspective, the punitive damages issue that was left open in the court's decision in August of 2003. Thank you.

MR. ROSENBAUCH: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. WEISS: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Proceedings concluded at 11:22 p.m.)
I, CHRISTINE FIORE, certify that the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.
s/Christine Fiore
Christine Fiore

Fiore Transcription Service, Inc.
67 Elaine Drive
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January 4, 2006

